4 customers prevailed in a long legal battle.
2 Some banks continued to operate as nonpar banks until the early 1980s.
This paper uses a different standard in judging the success or failure of the FedZs involvement in the operation of the check collection system: the effects of the FedZs payment services on the efficiency of the check collection system.
Analysis of efficiency focuses on the costs of banks in processing payments. In a more efficient payments system, banks are able to process the same payments at lower costs.
A broad assessment of the effects of Reserve Bank services on the efficiency of the payments system would deal with the following questions.
Is there evidence to support the hypothesis that Reserve Bank services improved the operation of the payments system relative to the way the payments system functioned just prior to the formation of the Fed? If Congress wanted to improve the efficiency of the payments system in 1913, alternatives to government provision of payments services would have included nationwide branch banking and reform of the legal foundation for check clearing. Would these alternative approaches have improved the efficiency of the payments system more than authorization for the Reserve Banks to provide payment services? Over the years since its founding, has the Fed enhanced or retarded innovations that improve the efficiency of the payments system? Does the Fed still have a valid role as a provider of payment services in the current environment of nationwide branch banking?
This paper has a narrow focus, examining only the first of these questions.
Evidence that Reserve Bank payment services improved the efficiency of the check collection system relative to its operation just prior to the formation of the 
OPERATION OF THE U.S. PAYMENTS SYSTEM PRIOR TO 1914
This section focuses on the payments system in the United States from around 1850 until the formation of the Fed in 1914. 4 
Payment Instruments
To understand the operation of the U.S. payments system from the 1850s until 1914, it is necessary to distinguish between checks and drafts, which differ in terms of the party that created the payment instrument. Depositors at banks created checks, which they made payable to the order of payees in settlement of obligations. Banks wrote drafts. A bank might draw a draft upon itself or upon an account that it maintained at another bank. When making a 6 payment in a distant city, a bank customer often purchased from its local bank a draft drawn on a bank in a major financial center.
A major change in the U.S. payments system occurred in the 1850s. Prior to the 1850s, the most important means of payment was currency. The dollar value of currency in the hands of the public exceeded the value of deposits, and the dollar value of payments settled using currency exceeded that settled using checks and drafts. After the 1850s, in contrast, checks and drafts became more important than currency: the dollar value of deposits exceeded that of currency, and the value of transactions settled using checks exceeded that settled using currency (Spahr, 1926, pp. 84-98) .
Selling drafts was a source of revenue for banks, since customers paid banks more than the face amount of the drafts. The business of selling drafts involved the expense of maintaining balances with the banks in major financial centers. When drafts cleared, generally through clearing houses in the financial centers, the banks on which they were drawn would debit the accounts of the banks that sold the drafts. Banks often replenished their balances with banks in the financial centers through transactions in local markets for domestic exchange.
Banks located in various communities established these markets for trading local money (deposits at local banks and coin and currency in their vaults) with other local banks that had balances due from banks located in financial centers.
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This system for interregional payments`use of drafts drawn upon banks in financial centers`changed around 1890. At that time it became more common for bank customers to make payments to parties located outside of their communities with checks drawn upon their local banks (Preston, 1920, p. 566, and Jones, 1931, pp. 172-73) . One way to date the use of checks for interregional payments is to examine the dates of actions by banks located in major financial centers to deal with the task of collecting checks drawn on banks located outside of the financial centers. Spahr (1926, pp. 119-30) lists a series of proposals and actions by banks to collect out-of-town checks, beginning in 1885. Major developments included the plans of the clearing houses in New York and Boston, each initiated in 1899, to deal with the collection of out-of-town checks (Cannon, 1910, and Hallock, 1903 ).
Methods of Collecting Checks
The growth in check transactions required a system for clearing a large number of checks among thousands of banks. 6 Checks drawn upon local banks were channeled through local clearing houses or delivered for payment directly to the issuers'Z banks. Banking law required banks to pay at par on checks presented at their place of business. Typically, banks collected local checks quickly and at par.
Collecting checks involved more time and expense when the collecting and paying banks were located in different communities. The nature of banking 8 law contributed to the time and expense of interregional check collection. While banking law required banks to pay at par on checks presented at their place of business, banks were permitted to pay less than par on checks presented to them by mail or other indirect means. The rationale for this deduction from the face amount, called an exchange charge, was that paying banks could incur certain expenses in remitting payments to out-of-town collecting banks, including the cost of transporting coin or bank notes to the collecting banks. When the staff of collecting banks or their agents presented checks at the place of business of paying banks, in contrast, they assumed the expense of taking the cash to the collecting banks.
Delays were another expense of collecting banks, in addition to exchange charges. Under banking law, a paying bank that received checks through the mail became the collecting agent for the bank that had sent the checks. The paying bank was therefore responsible for obtaining payment from itself. As a result, paying banks often remitted funds to collecting banks several days after receiving checks through the mail.
Collecting banks that mailed checks directly to the paying banks might have to absorb any exchange charges. Under banking law depositors could charge their banks with negligence in their collection practices if the banks attempted to impose on their depositors the exchange charges incurred because the banks mailed checks to the paying banks (Spahr, 1926, p. 104) .
Collecting banks attempted to minimize delays, exchange charges and charges of negligence by collecting through correspondent banks the checks they 9 received which were drawn upon banks located outside their communities.
Correspondent banks are defined as those that collect checks for other banks.
Respondent banks send checks to correspondents for collection. The depository bank is the bank where a check was first deposited in the collection process. The check is drawn on the paying bank. A collecting bank holds the check at some point in the collection process and attempts to collect from the paying bank either directly or though its agents.
Correspondent banks competed for the business of collecting checks. In attempting to give collecting banks the best terms (quickest collection at the lowest exchange charges), the correspondents developed methods to limit the exchange charges imposed by paying banks. Correspondents developed networks of banks that acted as their agents in presenting checks at the place of business of banks that set relatively high exchange charges. In collecting through correspondents and their agents, depository banks might receive less than the face amount of checks, but more than if the checks were sent directly to the paying banks through the mail. Also, depositors of the collecting banks would not have legal grounds for accusing them of negligence in their collection practices.
The process of collecting checks through correspondents as a means of avoiding exchange charges led to some notorious cases of checks passing through the offices of many banks and traveling over very long distances, relative to the actual distances between the depository banks and the paying banks.
Correspondent banks attempted to bring order and efficiency to the collection process. Some correspondents announced arrangements under which they would collect at par checks drawn upon lists of specific paying banks. Correspondents negotiated various arrangements with the paying banks on their par lists. In some cases, the respondents paid their correspondents at par for checks sent by the correspondents that were drawn upon accounts of their depositors. In addition, the respondents often served as agents for their correspondents in obtaining collection at par from other banks in their communities (Vest, 1940, p. 90) . Other correspondents, in contrast, offered to pay exchange charges to respondents on checks that the correspondents sent to them for collection, while the correspondents credited the accounts of respondents at par for checks sent by the respondents for collection. The respondents paid for this service by maintaining balances at the correspondents (Tippetts, 1929, pp. 258-59) . Some banks located outside of financial centers maintained balances with several correspondents in major cities so they would receive exchange charges on almost all of the checks presented to them by out-of-town banks (Willis, 1951, pp. 7-9) .
The prohibition of nationwide branch banking limited the ability of correspondent banks to bring order and efficiency to the collection process. The large number of banks and the complexity of correspondent banking relationships limited the degree to which correspondent banks could economize on the operating expenses associated with check collection and the interbank balances necessary for check collection. A depository bank or its correspondent had to maintain lists of paying banks for which correspondents provided par collection and route checks to the appropriate correspondents. Unless the correspondents of the depository and paying banks maintained balances with each other, a check would pass through other intermediaries with which these correspondents maintained accounts. A check might pass through several banks in the collection process from the depository to the paying bank. Thus, the arrangements for collection of interregional checks through correspondents encouraged the indirect routing of checks and forced a complex matrix of interbank balances to facilitate the collection system. Weinberg (1997, p. 39) argued that the circuitous routing of checks prior to the formation of the Fed did not necessarily indicate that the check collection networks operated by correspondents were inefficient. While these networks may have been efficient under the existing constraints on bank behavior and legal relationships between collecting and paying banks, such an argument does not necessarily imply that the collection system could not be made more efficient through changes in regulations (such as permission for nationwide branch banking), reform of the legal foundation for check clearing, or government provision of clearing services.
Governors interpreted the FRA as granting the Fed a mandate to promote a national par collection system for checks. 8 In the early years of the Fed's collection system, the Reserve Banks accepted for collection checks drawn upon all banks, including those that had not agreed to pay the Fed at par. The Reserve Banks used a variety of methods to collect at par from these nonpar banks, including hiring express agents to travel to the offices of the nonpar banks, present checks over the counter, and return with the funds. Some of the nonpar banks interpreted the Fed's collection practices as attempts to harass them into agreeing to pay the Fed at par. Banks had to collect checks drawn upon nonpar banks through channels other than the Reserve Banks.
8 Stevens (1996) argued that the founders of the Federal Reserve system did not see a need for participation of the Fed in check collection to improve the efficiency of the payments system. Instead, Stevens argued that the founders of the Fed considered the payment services of the Reserve Banks to have a different purpose: to serve as a kind of "glue" that tied the member banks to the Fed and gave them some use for the reserve balances they were required to hold at the Reserve Banks. If the legislative history by Stevens is valid, there was a sharp contrast between the views of the Board and the people who Stevens identified as the founders of the Fed on the mission of the Fed in offering check collection services.
RECORD OF THE RESERVE BANKS IN PROVIDING PAYMENT SERVICES

Chronology of Events
The Only about one-fourth of member banks joined the voluntary collection system. In its annual report for 1916, the Board expressed regret that the voluntary system had not been more successful, concluding that the voluntary plan would never achieve its objective of a universal par collection system for the U.S.
economy.
To promote this objective, the Board decided in April 1916 to change its collection plan from voluntary to compulsory for member banks. Under this new plan the Fed required each member to remit at par for checks the Reserve Banks presented for collection, including checks sent through the mail. Member banks were not, however, required to send checks to the Reserve Banks for collection.
The Board also adopted a policy of charging banks for the collection service: each Reserve Bank charged the depositing bank a fee per check which reflected its check collection expenses, initially ranging from 0.9 cents to 2 cents per check. For the nonmember banks that agreed to pay the Fed at par, the Fed began absorbing the expenses they incurred in remitting payment to the Reserve Banks.
One objective of this offer to nonmembers was to eliminate the argument that they could not remit at par because of the expenses they would incur in remitting payment.
Volumes of Reserve Bank Payment Services
The Reserve Banks very quickly became major processors of checks. Table 1 presents the number of checks cleared by the Reserve Banks and the dollar value of these checks relative to that cleared through the private clearing houses. In the period around the formation of the Fed, data were available on the dollar value of checks cleared through about 200 clearing houses in cities around the nation, which included the major financial centers and many relatively small cities. While this series does not reflect the dollar value of all checks, it provides the broadest measure available of check clearings outside the Federal Reserve System.
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The volume of checks processed by the Fed's clearing system rose rapidly after the Fed adopted its compulsory plan in 1916, rising to about 33 percent of the clearings through the private clearing houses in 1918. Table 1 The Federal Reserve had two advantages over private correspondents in the clearing of interregional checks. One advantage was the Fed's authority to mail checks to member banks and receive payment at par (Jones 1931, p. 138 ).
The other advantage was authority to establish offices throughout the nation.
With its network of offices, the Fed could route checks to its offices closest to the paying banks, rather than relying on a network of correspondent banks to move checks from collecting banks to paying banks.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Analysis of whether Reserve Bank services improved the efficiency of the check collection system requires a theoretical framework for defining and 11 See Garvy (1959) for a description of the data on check clearings. 12 The sharp rise in the Fed's market share after 1929 may reflect a flight to safety by respondent banks during the banking panics of the early 1930s. That is, respondent banks considered clearing checks through the Reserve Banks less risky than clearing through private correspondents. Respondent banks also behaved in this way during the 1980s; the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas had a sharp rise in its check clearings during the Texas banking crisis (Clair, Kolson and Robinson, 1995) . measuring efficiency. This framework must indicate how the Fed could possibly have improved efficiency of the check collection business, and indicate the type of data that would be relevant for testing the hypothesis that Reserve Bank services improved the efficiency of the check collection system.
Definition of Efficiency
The definition of efficiency focuses on the costs of banks, the main providers of payment services. The payments system operates more efficiently if banks can collect the same checks at lower cost. There are two categories of cost: operating costs, which absorb resources, and the opportunity cost to banks of holding cash. If banks can collect the same checks with lower operating costs or less cash, the payments system is more efficient. 13 This definition of efficiency abstracts for the effects of Reserve Bank services on the nature of payment instruments used in the economy, and the relative efficiency of different payment instruments. In contrast, Phillips (1998) argued that the Fed s services made the payments system less efficient by encouraging bank customers to make interregional payments with checks rather than drafts. People who made payments with drafts had incentives for rapid collection, since they had already paid their banks for the drafts. People who made payments with checks drawn upon their own transactions accounts, in contrast, benefited from slow collection. Thus, Phillips concluded that Reserve Bank services tended to create a payments system in which payments instruments cleared more slowly, with more float. A problem with Phillips analysis is that the use of checks for interregional payments predated the formation of the Fed, although Fed services may have stimulated an even greater use of checks for interregional payments. To illustrate check collection by adjacent banks, suppose on the first day of the simulation Bank 1 receives a check for $100 drawn upon Bank 2. Bank 1 20 will present the check to Bank 2 during the day, and Bank 2 will credit the demand account of Bank 1 on day 1 for $100.
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The simulation exercises calculate the number of banks that process each check and the number of days each check is in the process of collection. Averages for these numbers are used as measures of payments system efficiency: the payments system is more efficient if the average number of banks that handle a check is lower, and if the average number of days a check is in the collection process is shorter. In the illustration of Bank 1 receiving a check drawn on Bank 2, the check is handled by two banks and is in the collection process for one day.
A simulation called Collection through Correspondents is designed to reflect the method of collecting out-of-town checks that was common prior to the formation of the Fed. Each bank designates one of the other banks in the simulation as its correspondent. Banks presents checks directly to adjacent banks for collection the same day they receive the checks, and mail other checks to its correspondent for collection. In addition, each bank agrees to pay at par on checks mailed to them by their correspondents. The postal service delivers checks 14 In each simulation, the collected funds in interbank balances are netted bilaterally in the calculation of cash necessary for collecting checks. To illustrate bilateral netting, suppose on a given day in a simulation Bank 1 has $100 due from Bank 2, and Bank 2 has $200 due from Bank 1. After bilateral netting, Bank 1 has zero due from Bank 2, and Bank 2 has $100 due from Bank 1. Uncollected funds are not included in the bilateral netting. To illustrate, suppose that on day 1, Bank 3 receives a check for $100 drawn upon Bank 8, and Bank 8 receives a check for $100 drawn upon Bank 3. As of the end of day 1, each check is recorded as $100 of cash items in the process of collection (CIPC) held by each bank. These offsetting amounts would be netted only after the checks are presented to the paying banks for collection and credited to the interbank balances. 21 one day after they are mailed. Collecting banks are assumed to route checks to paying banks through channels that achieve collection at par.
Banks use the following principles in choosing their correspondents:
Paying banks prefer to delay the presentment of checks by their correspondents as long as possible. Therefore, banks do not choose adjacent banks as correspondents, since adjacent banks could present checks for payment the same day they receive the checks.
`
Banks are in more direct competition for customers with the banks adjacent to them than they are with banks located farther way. Since correspondents can learn a great deal about the operations of their respondents, a bank will not use the same correspondent as a bank located adjacent to it. The bank would not want one of its most direct competitors to gain an advantage through information disclosed by a common correspondent.
Each respondent wants its correspondent to collect checks as quickly as possible. Therefore, each bank will want its correspondent to be located between two banks so the correspondent can present checks directly to two banks the same day it receives checks drawn on these banks. This principle rules out Banks 1 and 10 as correspondents.
Among the correspondents that meet these criteria, respondent banks will choose the correspondents closest to them, so they can deal with any operational problems at minimum cost.
Each simulation involves the collection of checks among ten banks.
Effects of Reserve Bank collection services on measures of payments system efficiency are less pronounced in simulations with six or eight banks because the smaller the number of banks in a simulation, the higher the percentage of checks that are cleared by presenting them to adjacent banks. With ten banks, several combinations of respondents and correspondents satisfy these four criteria, but the results vary little among the possible combinations. One of the combinations of correspondents and respondents that satisfies these four criteria was selected arbitrarily.
In some cases a bank could reduce the number of days a check was in the process of collection by collecting through routes other than sending to their correspondents all checks not drawn upon adjacent banks. For instance, if a check is drawn on a bank next to an adjacent bank, a collecting bank could send a check to an adjacent bank on day 1, and the adjacent bank could present the check to the paying bank on day 2. In some cases, a collecting bank could reduce the time a check is in the collection process by one or two days by using such alternative routes for getting checks to the paying banks. The simulation of Collection through Correspondents is designed to incorporate alternative collection channels that reduce the number of days a check is in the collection process. Incorporating these alternative collection channels, which makes programming the simulation rather complex, has the flavor of the check collection process prior to the formation of the Fed as described in contemporary banking literature. If banks attempted to collect checks as quickly as possible, each check became a special project for the banker in discovering the quickest route to collection among available alternatives.
The process of check collection through correspondents is illustrated for a Since the identity of the banks on which checks are drawn is determined at random, a respondent bank may have a negative balance at its correspondent on some days. The collected balance of the respondent generated by sending checks to the correspondent would fall short of the value of checks that the correspondent has charged against the account of the respondent. A negative collected balance would be a loan by the correspondent to the respondent. In this simulation, such negative balances are not permitted, since the objective of the simulation is to determine the cash balances that a bank would need for check collection. Cash required for check collection without negative balances is determined as follows.
The simulation is run, the largest negative collected balance of each bank at its correspondent is determined, and the absolute value of that largest negative balance is added to the deposit at the correspondent each day. In the simulation of collection through correspondents, the average number of banks that handled a check across the five sets of checks is 2.96 banks, compared to 2.82 banks for collection through a Reserve Bank, or 5 percent higher for collection through correspondents. For each of the five sets of checks to collect, this number is higher for the simulation of collection through correspondents than for the simulation of collection through a Reserve Bank.
These simulation results illustrate the basis for lower operating costs of banks under check collection through Reserve Banks.
The simulation results indicate that it takes longer on average to collect a check through correspondents than through a Reserve Bank. The average length of time a check was in the collection process was 2.49 days for collection through 26 correspondents, compared with 2.27 days under collection through a Reserve
Bank, or about 10 percent higher for collection through correspondents. The cash required for collection of checks through correspondents is about 36 percent higher than the cash required for collection through a Reserve Bank.
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Testable Hypotheses
The theoretical foundation in this section yields three testable hypotheses:
First, development of the FedZs check collection system would tend to reduce the operating costs of the banking industry. Second, development of the FedZs collection system would permit banks to operate with lower ratios of cash to total assets. Third, when banks had a choice of using the FedZs collection system or the payments arrangements in use prior to the formation of the Fed, they would choose the FedZs services. 15 A possible concern about the simulations is that some of the cash necessary for check collection under Collection through Correspondents appears on the balance sheet of the Reserve Bank but is not counted as part of bank cash in the simulation of Collection through a Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank has CIPC among its assets on the days when it receives checks for collection and mails them to the paying banks. Under the simulation of Collection through Correspondents, this CIPC is on the books of the correspondents. Thus, the results in table 3 may exaggerate the amount by which the banking system could reduce it cash holdings by shifting check collection from correspondents to a Reserve Bank. To deal with this concern, the average CIPC on the books of the Reserve Bank could be added to the cash of banks under the simulation of Collection through a Reserve Bank. This adjustment has a small effect on the comparison of the simulations: table 3 reports that cash is 36 percent higher under Collection through Correspondents than under Collection through a Reserve Bank, whereas cash is 32 percent higher under Collection through Correspondents if the average CIPC of the Reserve Bank is added to cash in the simulation of Collection through a Reserve Bank.
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THE EVIDENCE
The theory section indicates that evidence of a positive effect of Reserve Bank collection services on payments system efficiency would be a reduction in the operating expenses of the banking industry. Unfortunately, data on bank costs around the time when the Fed developed its payment services are not sufficiently detailed for a test of this hypothesis. This section examines two types of evidence on whether the Fed's payment services improved the efficiency of the payments system. The first type of evidence is the rapid acceptance by banks of the FedZs check clearing services over the alternative arrangements for interregional collection that were available prior to the formation of the Fed. The second type of evidence is reductions in the cash ratios of banks that can be attributed to the banks, which were required to be Fed members. 17 In addition, about half of the states reduced their reserve requirements around the time the Fed was founded (see White, 1983; and Gilbert, 1998) . This division creates a type of experiment:
if the cash ratios of state banks declined around the time the Fed developed its payment services, were the declines limited to banks in states that reduced their reserve requirements?
Before examining the evidence on cash ratios, it is appropriate to consider customers who made payments out of demand deposits, a more ideal ratio might be cash to demand deposits. Data on the deposit liabilities of banks for the period covered in Figure 2 were of relatively poor quality, especially the division of deposits between demand and other deposits. See Board of Governors (1959) . For this reason, cash ratios in this article use total assets as the denominator.
Regression Analysis of Cash Ratios
While interpretation of Figure Values of the independent variable included to reflect the development of the FedZs collection system (FEDSHARE) are presented in the last column of Table 1: the value of checks collected through the Reserve Banks as a percentage of the value of checks cleared through the clearing houses. This is a national observation, one per year. The coefficient on FEDSHARE is hypothesized to be negative: growth of the FedZs collection services permits banks to operate with lower cash ratios.
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The measure of reserve requirements (REQUIRED) is derived by calculating the required reserves for state banks in each state each year, based on their reserve requirements and deposit liabilities, and dividing by their total assets.
The coefficient on REQUIRED is hypothesized to be positive: banks in states with higher reserve requirements hold higher cash ratios.
Three independent variables reflect the composition of securities owned by the banks. If U.S. Treasury securities served as secondary reserves, the coefficient on US TREASURIES would be negative: an increase in the share of assets held as Treasury securities would permit banks to operate with lower cash ratios. The other securities ratios (STATE&LOCAL and OTHER) are included to test whether other types of securities served as secondary reserves.
Some additional independent variables reflect the extent of branching in a state (BRANCH) and the proximity of banking offices to each other (DENSITY).
The theoretical basis for including these independent variables involves an application of inventory theory to the decisions of banks on the shares of their assets they hold as cash in their vaults. Banks hold vault cash to meet the demand of their depositors. An inventory too small would upset depositors, possibly triggering a run on the bank. Banks want to hold the minimum inventory that meets the demands of their depositors, however, because cash yields no interest.
The optimal inventory of cash depends on the expenses associated with increasing and decreasing vault cash.
BRANCH, which is a measure of the degree of branch banking in a state, is calculated as the ratio of the number of banking offices in the state (offices of 34 state and national banks) to the number of banks. A bank with more than one office will hold an inventory of cash at each office to meet the demand of its depositors. Since the bank does not know which office will face demands for cash, it will tend to hold a higher percentage of its assets in vault cash than if it had only one office. The coefficient on BRANCH is hypothesized to be positive.
When banks need more vaults cash, they are likely to get it from their own branches or from other banks, and when they have excess vault cash, they will deposit it with other banks. Expenses associated with adjusting the size of the inventory of vault cash will be lower in areas where banking offices are located closer together. The measure of the proximity of banking offices, DENSITY, is measured as the number of banking offices in a state divided by square miles.
The coefficient on DENSITY is hypothesized to be negative.
Prior to the 1930s when the federal government established deposit insurance, several states had deposit guarantee arrangements. The coefficient on INSURANCE --a dummy variable with a value of unity for states with deposit guarantee plans, zero otherwise --is hypothesized to be negative, since insurance may have allowed banks to operate with lower cash ratios because of less concern about depositor runs. Table 3 Identification of Dependent and Independent Variables Dependent Variable --natural log of the following ratio: for the state banks in each state, the sum of their cash (vault cash, demand balances due from banks and cash items in the process of collection) and divide by the sum of their total assets.
Independent Variables
FEDSHARE --the dollar value of checks cleared by the Reserve Banks as a percentage of the dollar value of checks cleared through the clearing houses.
REQUIRED --the required reserves of state banks in a state (required reserve ratios multiplied by the sum of their deposit liabilities subject to reserve requirements) divided by the sum of their total assets.
US TREASURIES --the sum of investments by state banks in securities issued by the federal government, divided by the sum of their total assets. STATE&LOCAL --the sum of investments by state banks in securities issued by state and local governments, divided by the sum of their total assets.
OTHER --the sum of investments by state banks in securities other than those issued by the federal, state or local governments, divided by the sum of their total assets. BRANCH --a measure of the extent of branch banking in a state: the number of banking offices in the state divided by the number of banks.
DENSITY --the number of banking offices in a state divided by the number of square miles in a state. F-statistic (8,991) for the hypothesis that the regional dummy variables are jointly significant: 7:153* *Statistically significant at the five percent level.
Note: newey-West adjustment for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity applied to the equation.
